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1 Introduction
One of the classic insights of international trade theory is that a countrys productivity growth
can a¤ect other countries real incomes through international trade. This is perhaps best
known from traditional models of inter-industry trade which show that real incomes can
change as a result of terms-of-trade e¤ects (Hicks, 1953). But it is also implied by newer models
of intra-industry trade which illustrate that there can further be prot-shifting (Venables,
1985) or rm delocation e¤ects (Venables, 1987). Importantly, the sign of these spillover
e¤ects is theoretically ambiguous so that countries could benet or su¤er from a trading
partners productivity growth.
These classic analyses have gained new relevance in light of Chinas spectacular produc-
tivity growth. For example, they clarify under what conditions Chinas rise might harm its
trading partners thereby addressing widely held concerns. As we will review in detail later
on, Chinas trading partners would su¤er from adverse terms-of-trade e¤ects if Chinas pro-
ductivity growth was biased towards industries in which China is a net importer. Moreover,
they would su¤er from detrimental prot shifting e¤ects if productivity growth was biased
towards industries in which rms are particularly protable. Finally, they would su¤er from
harmful rm delocation e¤ects if productivity growth was biased towards industries in which
consumers are particularly sensitive to changes in domestic variety.
In this paper, we use a quantitative general equilibrium trade model to measure the
spillover e¤ects of Chinas productivity growth. Our model nests the three spillover e¤ects
identied by the theoretical literature and species a rich economic environment featuring
multiple sectors, multiple factors, realistic input-output linkages, and so on. Our approach is
to rst estimate Chinas industry-level productivity growth and then use our model to calcu-
late what would have happened to real incomes around the world if only Chinas productivity
had changed. We need a model for this calculation because we want to isolate the spillover
e¤ects of Chinas productivity growth holding xed all other shocks which simultaneously
a¤ect the world economy.
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Our main nding is that the spillover e¤ects of Chinas productivity growth are small.
Focusing on the years 1995-2007 and the 14 largest economies in the world, we nd that the
cumulative real income e¤ects range from a loss of at most -0.2 percent to a gain of at most
0.2 percent with the average e¤ect being zero. There are two main reasons for this result.
First, Chinese imports actually only account for a small share of total expenditure averaging
a mere 1.3 percent in 2007. Second, Chinas productivity growth does not exhibit any strong
biases of the sort described earlier so that the resulting terms-of-trade, rm delocation, and
prot shifting e¤ects do not have a clear sign.
Despite the considerable attention our subject received in the theoretical literature, there
is relatively little related empirical work. Our paper is preceded mainly by Eaton and Kortum
(2002) who illustrate their seminal framework by quantifying the spillover e¤ects of hypothet-
ical US and German productivity shocks on other OECD countries. Eaton and Kortums
framework features only terms-of-trade e¤ects but no rm delocation or prot shifting e¤ects
and therefore ignores some of the channels through which productivity shocks transmit. Also,
it predicts full specialization according to comparative advantage but allows only for aggregate
productivity shocks so that productivity growth is always export-biased in e¤ect.1
Having said this, additional work has emerged since the rst draft of our paper. Probably
most closely related is the work by Di Giovanni et al (2014) who also consider the welfare
e¤ects of Chinas productivity growth. While our analysis has an ex post nature isolating
the spillover e¤ects of actual productivity shocks, Di Giovanni et al (2014) take an ex ante
approach simulating the spillover e¤ects of hypothetical growth scenarios. Our exercise is also
in a similar spirit as the analysis by Levchenko and Zhang (2016) who measure the evolution
of sectoral productivities in the world economy over multiple decades. Their main point is
that there has been productivity convergence in the sense that productivity grew faster in
sectors that were less productive initially.
In terms of its question, our paper is also related to the work of Autor et al (2013) which
1Fieler (2011) provides a similar exercise in an Eaton and Kortum (2002) model with non-homothetic
preferences.
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investigates the local labor market consequences of Chinese import competition in the US.
Their main nding is that local labor markets which are more exposed to Chinese import
competition also have higher unemployment, lower labor market participation, and reduced
wages. The same is true for the work of Bloom et al (forthcoming) which examines the impact
of Chinese import competition on technical change in the EU. Their main punchline is that
Chinese import competition lead to increased technical change within rms and reallocated
employment between rms towards more technologically advanced rms.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents an illustrative
model designed to convey our methodology in the clearest possible way. Section 3 extends
this illustrative model along a number of dimensions to develop a more realistic quantitative
framework. Section 4 turns to the empirical application in which we use this more realistic




Our illustrative model is based on a simple multi-country and multi-sector version of Krugman
(1980). Households supply a xed amount Lj of labor and make their consumption choices














where N is the number of countries, S is the number of industries, M eis is the number of
entrants in industry s of country i, xijs is the quantity of an industry s variety from country
i consumed in country j, js is the fraction of country j income spent on industry s varieties,
and s > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between industry s varieties.
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where lis is the labor requirement of an industry s rm from country i, 'is is the productivity
of an industry s rm from country i,  ijs is an iceberg trade barrier applying to industry s
shipments from country i to country j, and feis is a xed cost of entry. Notice that rms are
homogeneous within countries and industries but not across countries and industries which
gives rise to Ricardian comparative advantage.
We consider two versions of our model, one with free entry and one without. In the
version with free entry, feis > 0 and M
e
is adjusts until prots are zero for all rms. In the
version without free entry, feis = 0 and M
e
is is taken as given so that prots are positive for
all rms. As we will see, the spillover e¤ects of productivity shocks di¤er across these two
versions both qualitatively as well as quantitatively. They can be thought of as capturing
long-run and short-run adjustments and we will therefore refer to them as "long-run version"
and "short-run version" from now on.
2.2 Equilibrium for given productivities
Utility maximization yields the familiar demands xijs =
p sijs
P 1 sjs
jsEj , where pijs is the price








1 s is the ideal
price index in industry s of country j, and Ej is the total expenditure in country j. Prot
maximization implies that rms charge a constant markup over marginal costs giving rise to





, where wi is the wage rate in country i. Using
these formulas, it should be easy to verify that the equilibrium for given productivities can be
characterized by the following four conditions in which is denote the prots of an industry
s rm in country i:




































M eis (is (s   1) + wif
e
iss) (6)
The rst condition captures that total income consists of labor income and prot income
and the second is the formula for the ideal price index after substituting the pricing rule. The
third condition follows from the fact that rm prots are given by a constant share of rm
revenues minus xed entry costs and the last imposes that labor income has to equal the sum
of industry labor costs. To obtain the long-run version of the model, we set is = 0 and treat
M eis as endogenous. To obtain the short-run version, we instead set f
e
is = 0 and treat is as
endogenous. In both cases we get 2NS + 2N equations in 2NS + 2N unknowns with the
unknowns being fEi; wi;M
e
is; Pisg and fEi; wi; is; Pisg, respectively.
2.3 General equilibrium e¤ects of productivity shocks
These conditions can be used to isolate the general equilibrium e¤ects of productivity shocks
by performing a quantitative comparative statics analysis. This can be done most easily by
rst rewriting them in changes following the "exact hat algebra" approach of Dekle et al (2007)
allowing for changes in productivity as well as all endogenous variables. Letting a "hat" denote









ispijsxijs is the value of industry s trade owing from country i to country j, and
introducing the shorthand Lis = M
e
islis, it should be easy to verify that the long-run and
short-run versions of conditions (3) - (6) imply:
Case I: Long-run






































































The main advantage of this reformulation is that all coe¢cients of equations (7) - (14)
can now be backed out from widely available trade data and an estimate of s. In the
long-run, all industry revenues accrue to industry workers so that wiLis =
PN
j=1Xijs. In
















s=1Xijs and total labor income can be calculated from wiLi =
PS
s=1wiLis.
Notice that this procedure also ensures that equations (7) - (14) perfectly match industry-level
trade ows before the productivity shock.
To provide a sense of the general equilibrium adjustments predicted by these equations,
Panel A of Table 1 reports the e¤ects of a hypothetical productivity shock in a simple ex-
ample economy consisting of two countries (China and the US) and two industries (1 and 2).
Productivity is assumed to grow by 10 percent in industry 1 of China and trade ows are
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taken to be fully symmetric as detailed in the note to Table 1. The results under Case I refer
to the long-run and report adjustments in relative wages and entry, while the results under
Case II turn to the short-run and show adjustments in relative wages and prots, where the
prots are normalized by the corresponding wage e¤ects.
As can be seen, the relative wage of China is predicted to rise as a result of Chinas
productivity growth. Moreover, industry 1 of China either experiences entry or an increase
in prots while industry 2 of China either experiences exit or a decrease in prots with the
mirror image occurring in the US. Intuitively, industry 1 of China expands as a result of
the productivity shock which then bids up Chinese wages and forces industry 2 of China to
contract. In the long-run, this expansion occurs at the extensive margin while in the short-run
it occurs at the intensive margin which then brings about changes in industry prots as they
are proportional to industry scale.2
2.4 Welfare e¤ects of productivity shocks
Given these general equilibrium e¤ects of productivity shocks, the implied welfare e¤ects can
be computed straightforwardly. Changes in welfare are given by changes in real income which
are changes in nominal expenditure deated by changes in the ideal aggregate price index:
bVj = ÊjbPj . Given the Cobb-Douglas structure of aggregate preferences, this can be rewritten








A decomposition of this expression conrms that our framework indeed captures terms-of-
trade, rm delocation, and prot shifting e¤ects. In particular, small welfare changes can be











in the short-run which should
further clarify this point. The change in the pattern of specialization can also be understood in terms of two
basic equilibrium constraints. First, labor market clearing requires that the expansion of one industry leads to
the contraction of the other industry in the same country. Second, constant expenditure shares imply that the
expansion of one industry leads to the contraction of the same industry in the other country.
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written in terms of log-changes as d lnVj = d lnEj  
PS
s=1 jsd lnPjs. Log-di¤erentiating (3)









in the long-run version of the model and d lnEi = d lnwi +
PS
s=1 is (d lnis   d lnwi) and
d lnPjs =
PN




. In combination, this then yields the following decomposition of the



























































































The terms-of-trade e¤ect captures that country js real income increases if the prices of
its export goods increase relative to the prices of its import goods. The rm delocation
e¤ect captures that country js real income increases if it gains rms in industries in which
consumers have a high valuation of domestic variety at the expense of industries in which
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consumers have a low valuation of domestic variety. The prot shifting e¤ect captures that
country js real income increases if it expands more protable industries at the expense of less
protable industries. The last term shows what the welfare e¤ects of country js productivity
growth would be in the benchmark case of autarky.
The key determinants of the signs of these spillover e¤ects can be best explained using
the simple numerical example introduced above. Panel A of Table 2 reports the e¤ects of a
hypothetical 10 percent productivity growth in industry 1 of China on US welfare for three
di¤erent scenarios: China is a net exporter in industry 1, China is a net importer in industry
1, and there is no inter-industry trade. As one expects from the classic literature, the US
experiences a terms-of-trade gain if Chinas productivity growth is biased towards Chinas
export-oriented industry but a terms-of-trade loss if Chinas productivity growth is biased
towards Chinas import-competing industry.
One subtle di¤erence from the textbook analysis is that the terms-of-trade gain the US
experiences if Chinas productivity growth is biased towards Chinas export-oriented industry
exceeds the terms-of-trade loss it experiences if Chinas productivity growth is biased towards
Chinas import-competing industry. This is also reected in the fact that the US experiences
a positive terms-of-trade e¤ect even if there is no inter-industry trade. This di¤erence is due
to the existence of Krugman (1980) type intra-industry trade. In a sense, productivity growth
always features an export-bias in a Krugman (1980) model since each country specializes in
a unique set of varieties.
Panel A of Table 3 returns to the case of fully symmetric trade ows and illustrates the
role played by cross-industry di¤erences in s. It again reports the e¤ects of a 10 percent
productivity growth in industry 1 of China on US welfare. As can be seen, the US experiences
a positive rm delocation or prot shifting e¤ect if Chinas productivity growth is biased
towards the high s industry and a negative rm delocation or prot shifting e¤ect if it is
biased towards the low s industry. The intuition is that consumers have a higher valuation
for domestic variety in the low s industry and rms make higher prots in the low s industry
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so that an expansion of this industry is good news.
For example, if Chinas productivity growth is biased towards the high s industry, the
high s industry contracts and the low s industry expands in the US. In the long-run, these
adjustments occur at the extensive margin and benet the US because there is a domestic
variety gain in the more di¤erentiated industry at the expense of a domestic variety loss in
the less di¤erentiated industry. In the short-run, these adjustments occur at the intensive
margin and benet the US because the higher markup industry expands at the expense of the
lower markup industry thus increasing the total prots generated in the US.3
Overall, this discussion suggests that there are two key determinants of the sign of the
global spillover e¤ects of Chinas productivity growth: the correlation between Chinas pro-
ductivity growth and Chinas export-orientation, and the correlation between Chinas pro-
ductivity growth and the elasticity parameters s which parameterize the di¤erentiation of
products and the protability of rms. Of course, the magnitude of the spillover e¤ects also
depends critically on the pattern and volume of international trade as captured by the trade
shares jsijs and js in equations (16) and (17).
Notice that the rm delocation and prot shifting e¤ects from decompositions (16) and
(17) can also be seen in simple su¢cient statistics of the Arkolakis et al (2012) kind. Sub-
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ijs =
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m=1Xmjs





















that welfare is given by Vi =
Ei
Pi




isis in general from (3), we can













, where #i =
wiLi
Ei
is the share of labor income
in total income.












3One might wonder why US consumers benet from domestic entry into the low s industry even though
it comes at the expense of foreign exit out of the low s industry so that the total number of low s varieties
available to US consumers might go up or down. The reason is that our examples from Tables 1-3 all make the
realistic assumption that US consumers spend more on US varieties than on imported varieties so that they
care more about domestic variety e¤ects.
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M̂ eis implied by condition (14), this shows that entry
into low s industries improves welfare other things equal thus again highlighting the rm











. From this we can see that a reduction in the share of labor
income in total income (and hence an increase in the share of prots in total income) improves
welfare other things equal which illustrates again the prot shifting e¤ect. Of course, just
measuring ̂iis, M̂
e
is, and #̂i in the data would not be informative of the spillover e¤ects of
Chinas productivity growth since these are endogenous objects which are also a¤ected by all
other contemporaneous shocks.4
2.5 Limitations of this illustrative model
While this model usefully illustrates the essence of our methodology, it seems too stylized
to deliver plausible quantitative results. For this reason, we extend it along a number of
dimensions with the goal of addressing the most obvious concerns. In particular, we add
multiple factors, input-output linkages, aggregate trade imbalances, and heterogeneous rms
which all play important roles in trading economies. The end result is essentially a Ricardo-
Heckscher-Ohlin-Krugman-Melitz model with input-output linkages which combines all the
main traditions in the eld.
As we will see, this extended model still behaves similarly to the illustrative model which
is largely due to our specication of rm heterogeneity. In particular, we model rm hetero-
geneity using the Arkolakis et al (2012) version of Melitz (2003) which implies that it behaves
like a Krugman (1980) model in many ways. However, adding rm heterogeneity still proves
useful when it comes to estimating Chinas productivity growth. In particular, Chinas pro-
ductivity can also grow as a result of Melitz (2003) type selection e¤ects and we want to make








in perfectly competitive gravity models such as Eaton and Kortum (2002), where
"s < 0 denotes the trade elasticity. This again illustrates how such models do not capture the rm delocation
or prot shifting e¤ects identied in Venables (1985) and Venables (1987).
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sure not to erroneously ascribe such e¤ects to fundamental productivity growth.
3 Full model
3.1 Setup
Consumers again have Cobb-Douglas preferences across industries and CES preferences across
varieties within industries. However, the number of entrants into industry s of country i, which
we continue to denote by M eis, no longer conforms to the number of industry s rms from
country i serving market j, which we now label Mijs, because rms are heterogeneous and
face xed market access costs. Taking this into consideration and using a superscript "F" to














Firms no longer just hire workers but produce using a Cobb-Douglas combination of
labor, capital, and intermediate goods. In order to allow for cross-country and cross-industry
variation in factor-intensities and the importance of intermediate inputs, we allow for cross-
country and cross-industry variation in the respective Cobb-Douglas parameters and dene



















where Lis is the required amount of labor, Kis is the required amount of capital, C
I;s
i is
the required amount of intermediate consumption, si are the shares of value added in gross






i = 1, are the shares of labor and capital in value
added. To be clear, we refer to these inputs as "aggregate" because they combine labor,
capital, and intermediate goods and "country-industry-specic" because this is done with
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country-industry-specic weights. Labor and capital are freely mobile across sectors within
countries as usual.
Intermediate consumption is dened analogously to nal consumption using a Cobb-
Douglas-CES aggregator. However, we now also allow the Cobb-Douglas shares to vary by
downstream industry so that we can take the full input-output structure of the economy into
account. Using a superscript "I" to denote intermediate consumption, a superscript "t" (or
sometimes "s") to denote the downstream industry, and a subscript "s" (or sometimes "t")














Firm heterogeneity is captured by the following production process. Entrants into industry
s of country i have to hire feis units of Iis to draw their productivities ' from a Pareto





, where feis is a xed cost of entry, bis is the Pareto location
parameter, and s is the Pareto shape parameter. Entrants into industry s of country i
wishing to sell to country j further need to hire
xijs ijs
' units of Iis and fijs units of Ijs to
deliver xijs units of output to country j, where fijs is a xed cost of serving market j. Notice
that the xed market access costs are denoted in destination country inputs which simplies
the algebra.
3.2 Equilibrium for given productivities
Given the Cobb-Douglas structure of the aggregate input, labor costs account for a fraction
si
L;s













i cisIis, and intermediate goods expenditures account for
a fraction 1   si of total input costs, E
I;s
i = (1  
s
i ) cisIis, where cis is the unit cost of
the aggregate input Iis, wi is the wage rate, and ri is the interest rate. This implies that













All labor income, capital income, and prot income is distributed to households who
are further assumed to make an international transfer 




i = 0, and is introduced to accommodate aggregate trade imbalances. As










industry s varieties, where is are the expected prots of an entrant into industry s of country








i which captures the total expenditure on
industry s varieties in country i in the sense that Eis =
PN
m=1Xmis, where Xijs is again the
value of industry s trade owing from country i to country j. Together with equations (21)
























Prot maximization again requires that industry s rms from country i which serve




' in market j. However, the xed market access costs
now imply that only su¢ciently productive rms choose to serve market j. Given that



























s 1 . As should be clear, prot maximization also implies that
the unit costs of the aggregate input can be written as a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of wages,


























s 1 is an average productivity measure familiar from





s 1 'ijs after imposing the
Pareto assumption. The Pareto assumption also implies that the probability of drawing a









so that the relationship





M eis. This relationship can be used together with the pricing formula, the denition
of ~'ijs, and the denition of '
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Given our assumptions on xed and variable costs, the expected prots of an entrant into


























from the Pareto assumption. Moreover,























Ejs. These results can be used together with the




































where E (ivis) denotes the expected demand for inputs used directly in production so that
the three terms capture entry costs, production costs, and market access costs. Proceeding
analogously to the derivation of equation (26), it should be easy to verify that cisE (i
v
is) =















Ejs which can be com-












Eis. Substituting these terms into the input market clearing




i cisIis, and adding basic labor

















Analogously to the illustrative model, we can now again distinguish between the long-run
and the short-run by setting is = 0 and treatingM
e
is as endogenous or by setting f
e
is = 0 and
treating is as endogenous. In both cases, equations (22) - (29) represent a system of 6NS+2N
equations in 6NS+2N unknowns with the unknowns being fEis; cis; Pis; Lis;Kis;M
e
is; wi; rig
and fEis; cis; Pis; Lis;Kis; is; wi; rig, respectively.
3.3 General equilibrium e¤ects of productivity shocks
The general equilibrium e¤ects of productivity shocks can again be calculated using the "exact






, we now recover labor incomes, capital incomes, and intermediate good expenditures




i cisIis and wiLi =
PS







s=1 riKis, and E
I;s
i = (1  
s

































isis can be backed out from equations (26) and (27)






































M eis, the price index equation (25),
and the denitions of ~'ijs and '

ijs.






NXis which are the international
transfers required to accommodate the observed aggregate trade imbalances. This follows from







ranging equation (27), and then substituting for M eis (is + cisf
e
is) obtained after rearranging




















national transfers di¤er from aggregate net exports because the xed market access costs are
denominated in source country inputs which already implies that the income of country i is
generally di¤erent from the total expenditure on goods from country i. Combining this with
the earlier results, it is then easy to calculate total nal expenditures in the long-run, EFi =
PS
s=1 (wiLis + riKis)  


















i , and Eis =
PN
m=1Xmis. This then allows us to write equations

























































































































































































































is , and the full matrix of bilateral trade ows,
these equations can be used to calculate the general equilibrium e¤ects of productivity shocks
which are now captured by changes in the Pareto location parameters bis. This procedure
again ensures that these general equilibrium e¤ects are calculated from a reference point
which perfectly matches industry-level trade. Essentially, it imposes a restriction on the set
of unknown parameters fbis;  ijs; fijs; f
e
is; Li;Kig such that the predicted Xijs perfectly match









In order to corroborate our earlier assertion that the behavior of the model does not change
much as a result of adding rm heterogeneity, Panel B of Table 1 again reports the e¤ects
of a hypothetical productivity shock in a simple example economy which is set up just as
before. However, we now use our full model to calculate the counterfactuals setting L;si = 1,
K;si = 0, and 
s
i = 1 to focus on the role played by rm heterogeneity. As can be seen, the
e¤ects are identical assuming that we set the value of s in the full model equal to the value
for s   1 in the illustrative model, just as one would expect from the Arkolakis et al (2012)
literature.5
3.4 Welfare e¤ects of productivity shocks
Given these general equilibrium adjustments, it is again straightforward to calculate welfare
changes as real income changes. However, nominal income is now equal to nal goods expen-



















in the short-run which follows immediately from the denition of EFi and equation (22).
5While the exact isomorphism between a Krugman (1980) model and a Melitz (2003) model with Pareto
distributed productivities breaks down when there are multiple sectors, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2014)
have already shown that both models then still produce similar results. Our results are exactly identical in
Panel A and B of Table 1 only because we assume balanced trade in each industry.
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Decomposing this expression for the special case L;si = 1, 
K;s
i = 0, 
s
i = 1, and 
i = 0,
illustrates further that rm heterogeneity alone does not a¤ect the behavior of the model in
major ways. In particular, small welfare changes can then be written in terms of log-changes






jsd lnPjs. Log-di¤erentiating the denition of E
F
i and equation










the long-run version of the model and d lnEFi = d lnwi +
PS
s=1 is (d ln is   d lnwi) and
d lnPjs =
PN




































































































As can be seen, decompositions (47) and (48) which are based on a special case of the full
model are very similar to decompositions (16) and (17) which are based on the illustrative
model. The reason is that the additional selection e¤ects brought about by rm heterogeneity
exactly cancel in this specication as we discuss in detail in the working paper version of this
paper (Hsieh and Ossa (2015)). For example, Chinese productivity growth allows a larger
fraction of Chinese entrants to export but allows a smaller fraction of US entrants to survive
which has o¤setting e¤ects on the US price index.
Panels B of Table 2 and Table 3 verify that this similarity also holds quantitatively by
repeating the exercises from Panels A of Table 2 and Table 3 now using the full model assuming
again that L;si = 1, 
K;s
i = 0, and 
s
i = 1 to focus on the role played by rm heterogeneity.
These tables again set the value of s in the full model equal to the value for s   1 in the
illustrative model to make sure that the trade elasticities align. As we will see in our empirical
application, relaxing the restrictions L;si = 1, 
K;s
i = 0, and 
s
i = 1 does not change the results
too much in practice so that we only discuss the simplied case here.
It is instructive to consider again the su¢cient statistics of the Arkolakis et al (2012) type


















































isis in general given our restrictions 
L;s
i = 1, 
K;s
i = 0, 
s
i = 1, and






























which is exactly analogous














which di¤ers only from the respective formula in the






s(s 1) . As should be clear from the
derivation of this expression, this term appears because the productivity cuto¤ 'iis also
changes if there are changes in #̂i as a result of our particular assumptions about the nature
of xed exporting costs. Therefore, it does not reect a deep feature of heterogeneous rm
models either but arises from a mere technicality.
4 Empirical application
We now apply our framework to isolate the spillover e¤ects of Chinas productivity growth
between 1995 and 2007. We focus on the worlds 14 largest economies and a residual Rest of
the World. In our baseline specication, we include 14 traded goods sectors which comprise
agriculture, mining, and manufacturing as well as 1 nontraded sector which aggregates over
all other remaining industries of the economy. The goods made by these residual industries
are actually not all entirely nontraded so that our nontraded goods sector is really a traded
goods sector with little trade.
We need the complete matrix of industry-level trade ows Xijs including domestic sales,
industry-level estimates of the elasticity parameters s and s, and industry-level estimates of
Chinas productivity growths bbis. We further need information on the shares of value added in
gross production si , the coe¢cients from the input-output tables 
I;t
is , and the shares of labor
and capital in value added Lis and 
K
is . Our main data sources are Chinas Annual Survey
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of Industrial Production and the World Input-Output Database but we also use information
from the China Statistical Yearbook.6
4.1 Aggregation procedure for Xijs
Our data on international and internal trade ows comes from the world input-output tables
included in the World Input-Output Database. The data originally has 35 industries which
we aggregate to 15 industries by combining "Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry, and Fishing"
and "Mining and Quarrying" into "Other Tradables", "Textiles and Textile Products" and
"Leather, Leather and Footwear" into "Textiles and Leather", and everything from "Elec-
tricity, Gas, and Water Supply" until "Private Households with Employed Persons" into
"Nontraded Goods".
4.2 Estimation procedure for s and s
We estimate the demand elasticities s using the theoretical prediction that industry factor
payments are proportional to industry value added with the factor of proportionality being






7 Calculating factor payments involves
the rental rate of capital which we obtain by assuming that the sum of factor payments












. We make this assumption since it implies a plausible aggregate
prot share of 13 .
We estimate the trade elasticities s using the estimates of s and the theoretical prediction
that rm sales follow a Pareto distribution with shape parameter ss 1 within industries. We
follow Eaton et al (2011) in restricting attention to exporters only and back out the shape
6The Annual Survey of Industrial Production is a census of all state-owned plants and all large private
plants collected by Chinas National Bureau of Statistics. Additional details on this dataset can be found,
for example, in Hsieh and Klenow (2009). The World Input-Output Database is documented in Timmer et al
(forthcoming.)
7Strictly speaking, the model predicts that variable industry factor payments are proportional to industry
value added given the assumption that xed costs are also incurred in terms of labor, capital, and intermediate
goods. We do not take this assumption literally when taking the model to the data and treat all reported
factor payments as variable factor payments.
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parameter of the rm sales distribution from a regression of the logarithm of the rm sales rank
on the logarithm of rm sales. For our estimation of s and s, we use data on wage payments,
capital stocks, and rm sales from the Chinese Annual Survey of Industrial Production.
4.3 Estimation procedure for b̂is
Our estimation of Chinas productivity growth proceeds in two steps. In the rst step, we
estimate the productivity growth of the representative Chinese rm in each industry be'iis.
In the second step, we calculate the fundamental Chinese productivity growth bbis in each
industry from be'iis by correcting for Melitz (2003) selection e¤ects. Recall that an increase in
the Pareto location parameter bis shifts the entire distribution of possible productivity draws
to the right. It di¤ers from e'iis because not all Chinese entrants nd it optimal to serve the
Chinese market given the xed costs fiis.
Our model suggests to estimate be'iis as the growth rate of real industry output per input,
where the input is the Cobb-Douglas combination of labor, capital, and intermediate goods









are the total sales in industry s of country i and Iis is the total input use in industry s
of country i.8 The representative price piis (e'iis) is an output share weighted average of







gsi ('j' > '

iis) d'.
One practical problem is that calculating Îis requires information on Ĉ
I;s








from equation (19). Recall that CI;si is the Cobb-Douglas-
CES aggregate (20) which is not directly observable. One solution would be to deate in-
termediate good expenditures P I;si C
I;s
i with some proxy for the intermediate good price in-
dex P I;si but our datasets do not include any such price deators. We therefore rewrite
8Strictly speaking, Iis is the total input use in industry s of country i net of xed costs because we have
assumed xed costs to be incurred in terms of the same input. As explained in footnote 7, we do not take this
assumption literally when taking the model to the data.
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reasonable assumption that the growth rate of real industry output bSis= \piis (e'iis) is approx-












. We proxy for the representative price piis (e'iis) using
producer price deators which we obtain from the China Statistical Yearbook.9
E¤ectively, we therefore calculate be'iis as the growth rate of real output per composite
factor of production scaled by the share of value added in gross production si . The intuition









alone overestimates the productivity growth
rate be'iis because bSis also grows due to the improved supply of intermediate goods. Given our
restriction bSis= \piis (e'iis) = ĈI;si and our decision to proxy for \piis (e'iis) using producer price
deators, we expect some measurement error in our estimates of be'iis which we attempt to
mitigate by averaging them across years.
We use the structure of the model to back out the fundamental productivity growth rates






s be'iis which captures that fundamental productivity growth can be inferred






M eis as well as the formula for ~'ijs. The correction is necessary
because, for example, an increase in Miis leads to a decrease in measured productivity other
things equal since the new rms are less productive than the incumbent rms due to selection
e¤ects.





s be'iis depends on whether we use the
long-run or the short-run version of the model. In the short-run version of the model, M̂ eis = 1









s be'iis using the changes
in the number of active Chinese plants documented in the Annual Survey of Industrial Pro-
9Notice that the growth rate of total sales is the same as the growth rate of value added in our model since
we assume that value added makes up a constant share of gross production. We work with the growth rate of
value added in our calculations.
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duction. In the long-run version of the model, we have to take a more indirect approach













Ejs, the denition of e'ijs, and the deni-








, which follows from realizing that equation (26) can
















is the inverse measure of trade openness introduced earlier. Assuming














i , and 
K;s
i
We obtain our estimates of the shares of value added in gross production, si , and the coef-
cients of the input-output tables, I;tis , from the world input-output tables included in the































, where XI;smit is the value of intermediate goods from industry
t in country m purchased by industry s in country i and Xins is again just the total value of
industry s trade owing from country i to country n.
Notice that these estimates average over countries and downstream industries, si = 
s
and I;tis = 
I
s for all i and t. As is explained in detail in Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare


















in our calculations because entry would then lead to a process of cumulative
causation in some countries and industries in the long-run version of our model. Intuitively,
if the share of value added in gross production is too low and the expenditure share on
intermediates is too high in some industries, entry induces further entry because the increased
variety reduces input costs too much.10
10When faced with the same problem, Balisteri et al (2011) only average over downstream industries. Un-
fortunately, this is not su¢cient in our case so that we average over countries as well. Strictly speaking, our














, where NXis is the value of net exports in
industry s of country i. The adjustment s s+1
ss
NXis is necessary because of our assumption that the xed
costs of exporting are incurred in destination country labor, capital, and intermediates. We do not take this
assumption literally when taking the model to the data.
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We calculate the shares of labor and capital in value added from the Socio Economic Ac-
counts available from the World Input Output Database. These accounts include information
on labor compensation, capital compensation, and value added so that we can construct the
shares L;si and 
K;s
i straightforwardly.
4.5 Isolating the e¤ects of Chinas productivity growth
Our goal is to isolate the spillover e¤ects of Chinas productivity growth. To this end, we
plug the measured productivity growth rates b̂is into our model and simulate what would have
happened to the world economy if only Chinas productivity had changed. We do this on a
year-to-year basis considering all time periods from 1995-1996 until 2006-2007 and aggregate
over the entire time span 1995-2007 in the end. For each time period, we use the trade data
from the base year, that is 1995 trade data for the time period 1995-1996 and so on.11 Of
course, world trade ows change for many reasons other than Chinas productivity growth
so that the factual end-of-period trade ows are generally di¤erent from the counterfactual
end-of-period trade ows our productivity growth counterfactuals predict.
When calculating our counterfactuals using the long-run version of the model, we relax the
implicit assumption that the free entry condition always binds in all countries and industries
which results in the prediction of negative entry if zero prots are not compatible with positive
production. Specically, we do not immediately compute the counterfactuals with the actual
vector of productivity growths but instead take slowly increasing fractions of it, starting at zero
and progressing in ve percentage point steps. Whenever the number of entrants is predicted
to be less than 1 percent of its original value in a particular country and industry, M̂ eis < 0:01,
we replace the free entry condition for that country and industry with the condition that there
is no entry in that country and industry, M̂ eis = 0, thereby imposing a corner solution. This
happens very rarely in practice.
11More precisely, we allow Xijs, 
s
i , and 
I;t






Table 4 reports the share of imports from all countries in total expenditure, both excluding
as well as including nontraded goods. Table 5 summarizes the share of imports from China
in total expenditure, again excluding as well as including nontraded goods. As can be seen,
the share of Chinese imports in total expenditure is small in absolute terms even though the
share of Chinese imports in total imports is rising over time. This suggests that the spillover
e¤ects of Chinas productivity growth will be small since they transmit through import shares
as the decompositions (47) and (48) make clear.
Our estimates of s and s are listed in Table 6. Our estimates of s range from 3.1 to
16.1 and average 6.1 and our estimates of s range from 3.0 to 39.9 and average 8.5. These
averages are broadly within the range of existing estimates found in the literature.12 Notice
that our estimates of s and s are such that s is larger than s   1 throughout. This
is consistent with our earlier theoretical assumption that s > s   1 and implies that the
sales distribution deviates somewhat from Zipfs law. It ensures that the expected prots of
entrants are always nite in all industries.
Our estimates of Chinas annual productivity growth rates are also listed in Table 6.
We obtain these numbers by rst calculating the annual productivity growth rates over





























adjusts this by the share of






























adjust this further to










































  1. As one
would expect, our estimates of Chinas productivity growth fall substantially once we incorpo-
12Eaton and Kortum (2002), for example, estimate the trade elasticity to be 3.6 in one specication and 8.3
in another specication.
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rate intermediate goods. This simply reects the fact that productivity shocks then propagate
through input-output linkages so that smaller changes in ~'is are needed to generate the same
change in real value added per composite factor of production.





































for Melitz (2003) selection e¤ects using the long-run or short-run version of the model. As can
be seen from this gure and Table 6, these estimates are quite similar across specications
with the adjustments using the short-run model making somewhat more of a di¤erence. This
similarity reects the fact that the trade exposure of Chinese industries and the number of









s tend to be relatively small.
Table 7 summarizes the welfare e¤ects of Chinas productivity growth between 1995-
2007 calculated using our methodology. In particular, we take the productivity estimates
from Table 6 and calculate their welfare implications using formula (46) after solving for
their general equilibrium e¤ects using conditions (30) - (37) or (38) - (45). We calibrate all












and the full matrix
of bilateral trade ows for the respective base year. We use the geometric average of our
annual productivity growth estimates to attenuate measurement error but update our trade
data each year to take into account Chinas rising trade openness.
The entries in Table 7 capture what would have happened to welfare around the world if
only Chinas productivity had changed. The top panel shows the results computed using the
long-run version of the model while the bottom panel turns to the results computed using the
short-run version of the model. The rst column gives the predicted welfare e¤ects on China,
the second and third columns the predicted welfare e¤ects on the "World" and the "Rest of
the World" dened as the output share weighted averages of the predicted welfare e¤ects on
all countries and all countries other than China, and the last column the ratios of the entries
in columns three and two. The last row computes the cumulative e¤ects by taking geometric
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averages of the annual e¤ects in the previous rows.
Using the long-run version of the model, Chinas welfare is predicted to increase by a
cumulative 253.7 percent, "World" welfare is predicted to increase by a cumulative 7.9 percent,
and "Rest of the World" welfare is predicted to decrease by a cumulative -0.029 percent. Using
the short-run version of the model, Chinas welfare is predicted to increase by a cumulative
218.4 percent, "World" welfare is predicted to increase by a cumulative 7.2 percent, and "Rest
of the World" welfare is predicted to increase by a cumulative 0.016 percent. This implies
that only a small fraction of the overall welfare gains brought about by Chinas productivity
growth is predicted to spill over to other countries (-0.4 percent according to the long-run
version of the model and 0.2 percent according to the short-run version of the model).
One reason for this is that Chinese imports only account for a small share of total ex-
penditure, as we saw from Tables 4 and 5. This is a simple but often overlooked point since
all international trade shocks have to lter through import shares eventually. Another rea-
son is that Chinas productivity growth does not exhibit any strong correlation with respect
to Chinas export orientation or trade elasticity, as we will see below. Recall from our ear-
lier discussion that these correlations are important because they determine the signs of the
terms-of-trade, rm delocation, and prot shifting e¤ects.
The entries under "Full model" in Table 8 elaborate on the averages presented in Table
7 by showing the welfare e¤ects of Chinas productivity growth by country. They show that
the predicted spillover e¤ects are not only close to zero on average but also small for each
country individually, ranging from -0.23 percent until 0.23 percent using the long-run model
and ranging from -0.02 percent to 0.08 percent using the short-run model. These are again
cumulative welfare e¤ects calculated over the entire time period 1995-2007.
The entries under "Special case" in Table 8 show the results calculated using a simplied
version of the model without multiple factors, nontraded, and intermediate goods. Notice that
the average predictions of the full model and the special case are very similar which is because
nontraded goods tend to dampen while intermediate goods tend to magnify spillover e¤ects.
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However, there is more variation in the country-by-country predictions as is also visualized in
Figure 2.
We consider this special case to get a rough sense of the terms-of-trade, rm delocation,
and prot shifting e¤ects. Recall that we can decompose the welfare e¤ects of productivity
shocks into their terms-of-trade, rm delocation, and prot shifting components following
formulas (47) and (48) in the absence of multiple factor and intermediate goods. The result
of this decomposition is shown in Table 9 where we have scaled all entries to sum to the
numbers in Table 8. Recall that formulas (47) and (48) only provide a linear approximation
so that the decomposition is not exact given Chinas large productivity shocks.
As can be seen, the terms-of-trade, rm delocation, and prot shifting e¤ects appear to
be just as small as the overall welfare e¤ects. The reason for this can be seen in Figures 3 and
4 which plot the estimated productivity growth rates against Chinas export-orientation and
the trade elasticity revealing only weak correlations in the long-run version of the model and
essentially no correlations in the short-run version of the model. The strongest among them
is the positive correlation in the top panel of Figure 3 but even this is too weak to generate
more than minimally negative terms-of-trade e¤ects.
It is interesting to contrast these ndings with the broader literature on the characteristics
of Chinese exports and their impact on other countries rms and labor markets such as
Khandewal (2010), Autor et al (2013), or Bloom et al (forthcoming). This literature nds
that Chinas exports expanded primarily in its comparative advantage industries which make
unskilled-labor intensive, low-quality goods. Our results suggest that this is likely due to
lowering trade barriers as Chinas productivity growth does not appear to be biased towards
its comparative advantage industries. If anything, the correlation goes in the other direction
suggesting that China might instead be catching up with the frontier.
Figure 5 plots the average entry rates predicted by the long-run and short-run versions
of the model against Chinas productivity growth. Recall that both versions make extreme
assumptions regarding entry, either allowing for completely free entry or for no entry at all.
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These extreme assumptions are also reected in extreme entry predictions, which range from
-19 percent until 21 percent in the long-run version of the model and are always 0 percent
in the short-run version of the model. Actual entry rates averaged between -1 percent and 6
percent according to our micro data so that one might think reality lies somewhere in between
these two extremes. In any case, both versions deliver the same overall message which is that
the spillover e¤ects of Chinas productivity shocks are small.
5 Conclusion
How does a countrys productivity growth a¤ect worldwide real incomes through international
trade? In this paper, we took this classic question to the data by measuring the spillover e¤ects
of Chinas productivity growth. Using a rich quantitative general equilibrium trade model, we
rst estimated Chinas industry-level productivity growth during the time period 1995-2007
and then isolated what would have happened to real incomes around the world if only Chinas
productivity had changed. We found that the spillover e¤ects were small for all countries,
ranging from a cumulative real income loss of at most -0.2 percent to a cumulative real income
gain of at most 0.2 percent.
There are advantages and disadvantages to our choice of using a model to quantify the
spillover e¤ects of Chinas productivity growth. The main advantage is that it allows us to
hold constant all other shocks that might have contemporaneously hit the world economy
thereby cleanly isolating the e¤ects of productivity growth. The main disadvantage is that
we have to maintain the assumption that our model is an accurate description of reality
which would not have been necessary in a more reduced-form approach. On balance, our
ndings therefore have to be interpreted with some caution and are probably best thought of
as providing a sense of the orders of magnitude.
In any case, our analysis is only a rst pass at this question. Of the many possible
extensions, a particularly interesting one would be to let aggregate manufacturing employment
respond endogenously to productivity growth. On the one hand, this would dampen relative
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wage growth in China thereby generating terms-of-trade gains for the rest of the world. On
the other hand, this would relocate aggregate manufacturing employment to China thereby
inicting rm delocation and prot shifting losses on the rest of the world. These counteracting
e¤ects may well been quantitatively important in the case of China given the extent of rural-
urban migration observed during the sample period.
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6 Tables
TABLE 1: Hypothetical E¤ect of Chinese Productivity Growth on Relative Wages, Entry, and Prots











4.3% 21.5% -21.5% -22.4% 22.4%
Case II: Short-run
ŵCH=ŵUS ̂CH;1=ŵCH ̂CH;2=ŵCH ̂US;1=ŵUS ̂US;2=ŵUS
4.3% 7.5% -7.5% -7.8% 7.8%











4.3% 21.5% -21.5% -22.4% 22.4%
Case II: Short-run
ŵCH=ŵUS ̂CH;1=ŵCH ̂CH;2=ŵCH ̂US;1=ŵUS ̂US;2=ŵUS
4.3% 7.5% -7.5% -7.8% 7.8%
Notes: Entries are predicted growth rates in Chinese wage relative to US wage (column 1), Chinese number
of entrants in industry 1 and 2 (columns 2 and 3, case I) or normalized Chinese prots in industry 1 and
2 (columns 2 and 3, case II), and US number of entrants in industry 1 and 2 (columns 4 and 5, case I) or
normalized US prots in industry 1 and 2 (columns 4 and 5, case II) from 10% productivity growth in China
in industry 1. Simulation assumes that nominal incomes are the same in both countries, industry expenditure
shares are 50% in both countries and industries, and import expenditure shares are 20% in both countries and
industries. Panel A uses the simple model and assumes sigma1=sigma2=6. Panel B uses the full model and
assumes theta1=theta2=5, rhol1=rhol2=0.99, rhok1=rhok2=0.01, and eta1=eta2=1 (the values of sigma and
the intermediate expenditure shares make no di¤erence to the results in this special case).
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TABLE 2: Hypothetical E¤ect of Chinese Productivity Growth on US Welfare
A: Results obtained using the illustrative model
Case I: Long-run
Terms-of-trade + Firm delocation  Total
NXCH;1> 0 0.6% 0.0% 0.8%
NXCH;1= 0 0.1% 0.0% 0.4%
NXCH;1< 0 -0.4% 0.0% -0.2%
Case II: Short-run
Terms-of-trade + Prot shifting  Total
NXCH;1> 0 0.6% 0.0% 0.7%
NXCH;1= 0 0.1% 0.0% 0.2%
NXCH;1< 0 -0.4% 0.0% -0.3%
B: Results obtained using a special case of the full model
Case I: Long-run
Terms-of-trade + Firm delocation  Total
NXCH;1> 0 0.6% 0.0% 0.8%
NXCH;1= 0 0.1% 0.0% 0.4%
NXCH;1< 0 -0.4% 0.0% -0.2%
Case II: Short-run
Terms-of-trade + Prot shifting  Total
NXCH;1> 0 0.6% 0.0% 0.7%
NXCH;1= 0 0.1% 0.0% 0.2%
NXCH;1< 0 -0.4% 0.0% -0.3%
Notes: Entries are predicted growth rates in US real income due to the terms-of-trade e¤ect (column 1) and the
rm delocation e¤ect (column 2, case I) or prot shifting e¤ect (column 2, case II) from 10% productivity growth
in China in industry 1 following equations (16) and (17). Column 3 calculates net welfare gain following equation
(15). Simulation assumes that nominal incomes are the same in both countries and industry expenditure shares
are 50% in both countries and industries. In the rst row, China is assumed to have an import expenditure
share of 10% in industry 1 and an import expenditure share of 30% in industry 2 with the US being the mirror
image so that China is a net exporter in industry 1. In the second row, import expenditure shares are assumed
to be 20% in both countries and industries so that there is only intra-industry trade. In the third row, China
is assumed to have an import expenditure share of 30% in industry 1 and an import expenditure share of 10%
in industry 2 with the US being the mirror image so that China is a net importer in industry 1. Panel A uses
the simple model and assumes sigma1=sigma2=6. Panel B uses the full model and assumes theta1=theta2=5,
rhol1=rhol2=0.99, rhok1=rhok2=0.01, and eta1=eta2=1 (the values of sigma and the intermediate expenditure
shares make no di¤erence to the results in this special case).
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TABLE 3: Hypothetical E¤ect of Chinese Productivity Growth on US Welfare
A: Results obtained using the illustrative model
Case I: Long-run
Terms-of-trade + Firm delocation  Total
1> 2 -0.2% 1.2% 1.2%
1= 2 0.1% 0.0% 0.4%
1< 2 0.5% -1.0% -0.4%
Case II: Short-run
Terms-of-trade + Prot shifting  Total
1> 2 -0.2% 0.5% 0.4%
1= 2 0.1% 0.0% 0.2%
1< 2 0.5% -0.5% 0.1%
B: Results obtained using a special case of the full model
Case I: Long-run
Terms-of-trade + Firm delocation  Total
1> 2 -0.2% 1.0% 1.0%
1= 2 0.1% 0.0% 0.4%
1< 2 0.4% -0.9% -0.2%
Case II: Short-run
Terms-of-trade + Prot shifting  Total
1> 2 -0.2% 0.4% 0.4%
1= 2 0.1% 0.0% 0.2%
1< 2 0.4% -0.4% 0.0%
Notes: Entries are predicted growth rates in US real income due to the terms-of-trade e¤ect (column 1) and
the rm delocation e¤ect (column 2, case I) or prot shifting e¤ect (column 2, case II) from 10% productivity
growth in China in industry 1 following equations (16) and (17). Column 3 calculates net welfare gain following
equation (15). Simulation assumes that nominal incomes are the same in both countries, industry expenditure
shares are 50% in both countries and import expenditure shares are 20% in both countries and industries. Panel
A uses the simple model and assumes sigma1=8 and sigma2=4 in the rst row, sigma1=6 and sigma2=6 in the
second row, and sigma1=4 and sigma2=8 in the third row. Panel B uses the full model and assumes theta1=7
and theta2=3 in the rst row, theta1=5 and theta2=5 in the second row, and theta1=3 and theta2=7 in the
third row, as well as rhol1=rhol2=0.99, rhok1=rhok2=0.01, eta1=eta2=1, and sigma1=sigma2=3 throughout
(the values of sigma and the intermediate expenditure shares make no di¤erence to the results in this special
case).
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TABLE 4: Share of Imports in Total Expenditure
w/o non-traded w/ non-traded
1995 2001 2007 1995 2001 2007
Brazil 10.3% 15.5% 13.0% 4.9% 7.4% 6.4%
Canada 44.3% 49.1% 45.9% 18.2% 19.9% 17.2%
Germany 28.6% 38.7% 46.1% 11.2% 15.8% 19.4%
Spain 24.5% 33.3% 38.8% 10.5% 14.5% 15.0%
France 29.6% 35.2% 40.5% 10.1% 12.7% 13.2%
United Kingdom 34.2% 41.7% 47.2% 13.1% 13.2% 13.6%
India 8.1% 12.5% 19.0% 5.7% 7.0% 11.1%
Italy 23.3% 27.7% 31.9% 10.5% 11.8% 13.3%
Japan 9.1% 12.6% 18.5% 3.7% 4.8% 7.6%
South Korea 21.8% 25.0% 26.6% 12.7% 14.5% 16.0%
Mexico 25.4% 31.2% 34.7% 12.9% 14.6% 16.0%
Russia 20.9% 22.8% 23.7% 10.7% 11.5% 11.0%
United States 17.6% 21.5% 26.1% 6.1% 6.5% 8.1%
Rest of the World 21.4% 23.4% 26.8% 12.3% 13.4% 14.8%
Median 22.6% 26.3% 29.4% 10.6% 12.9% 13.5%
Notes: Entries are imports/total expenditure, either excluding or including non-traded goods.
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TABLE 5: Share of Chinese Imports in Total Expenditure
w/o non-traded w/ non-traded
1995 2001 2007 1995 2001 2007
Brazil 0.2% 0.4% 1.4% 0.1% 0.2% 0.6%
Canada 1.2% 1.6% 4.2% 0.5% 0.7% 1.5%
Germany 0.7% 1.1% 3.2% 0.2% 0.4% 1.2%
Spain 0.3% 0.6% 2.0% 0.1% 0.3% 0.9%
France 0.5% 0.8% 2.2% 0.1% 0.3% 0.7%
United Kingdom 0.8% 1.5% 3.2% 0.3% 0.5% 0.8%
India 0.3% 0.7% 2.8% 0.2% 0.4% 1.5%
Italy 0.4% 0.6% 1.6% 0.2% 0.3% 0.6%
Japan 0.8% 1.6% 3.4% 0.3% 0.6% 1.3%
South Korea 1.1% 2.4% 4.6% 0.7% 1.5% 2.8%
Mexico 0.2% 0.7% 3.4% 0.1% 0.3% 1.5%
Russia 0.5% 1.0% 2.8% 0.3% 0.5% 1.3%
United States 1.0% 1.4% 3.9% 0.3% 0.4% 1.1%
Rest of the World 0.8% 1.4% 4.0% 0.4% 0.8% 1.9%
Median 0.6% 1.1% 3.2% 0.3% 0.4% 1.3%
Notes: Entries are imports from China/total expenditure, either excluding or including non-traded goods.
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Other tradables 6.1 8.5 11.2% 3.5% 3.5% 3.7%
Food, beverages, and tobacco 3.3 6.1 12.3% 3.5% 3.5% 3.3%
Textiles and leather 6.1 9.5 6.7% 2.1% 2.2% 2.6%
Wood and products of wood and cork 4.6 7.1 10.7% 3.5% 3.6% 4.3%
Pulp, paper, printing and publishing 16.1 39.9 9.3% 3.5% 3.5% 3.6%
Coke, rened petroleum, and nuclear fuel 6.5 8.5 7.5% 2.1% 2.1% 2.7%
Chemicals and chemical products 11.4 37.4 13.8% 4.5% 4.5% 4.6%
Rubber and plastics 6.3 11.5 9.6% 3.2% 3.2% 3.7%
Other non-metallic minerals 3.5 6.7 12.0% 4.7% 4.7% 4.7%
Basic metals and fabricated metals 3.1 4.9 12.4% 4.0% 4.0% 5.0%
Other machinery 8.0 22.3 12.5% 4.3% 4.3% 4.5%
Electrical and optical equipment 3.5 5.6 13.1% 4.2% 4.0% 5.3%
Transport equipment 7.4 18.9 11.2% 3.1% 3.0% 3.2%
Other manufacturing and recycling 3.1 3.0 7.3% 2.7% 0.5% 3.7%
Non-tradables 6.1 8.5 11.2% 3.5% 3.5% 3.7%
Median 6.1 8.5 11.2% 3.5% 3.5% 3.7%
Notes: Entries are industry descriptions, estimated s, estimated s, and the geometric averages of the es-
timated annual growth rates of measured productivity before adjusting for intermediate goods, measured
productivity after adjusting for intermediate goods, and fundamental productivity after adjusting for inter-
mediate goods derived from the long-run and short-run versions of the model. Since we only have data on
Chinese manufacturing rms, we cannot estimate these parameters for "Other tradables" and "Non-tradables"
and simply use the average values for those.
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TABLE 7: Welfare Gains from Chinas Productivity Growth
Case I: Results obtained using the long-run version of the model
China World Rest of World Share Rest of World
95-96 10.7% 0.4% -0.001% -0.3%
96-97 10.7% 0.4% -0.001% -0.1%
97-98 11.0% 0.5% -0.001% -0.2%
98-99 10.8% 0.5% -0.001% -0.2%
99-00 10.6% 0.5% -0.001% -0.2%
00-01 10.8% 0.6% -0.002% -0.4%
01-02 10.8% 0.6% -0.003% -0.6%
02-03 10.7% 0.7% -0.003% -0.5%
03-04 11.1% 0.7% -0.003% -0.4%
04-05 11.2% 0.8% -0.002% -0.2%
05-06 12.0% 0.9% -0.004% -0.4%
06-07 12.9% 1.1% -0.007% -0.7%
95-07 253.7% 7.9% -0.029% -0.4%
Case II: Results obtained using the short-run version of the model
China World Rest of World Share Rest of World
95-96 9.8% 0.3% 0.001% 0.2%
96-97 9.8% 0.4% 0.001% 0.2%
97-98 10.0% 0.4% 0.000% 0.0%
98-99 9.9% 0.5% 0.000% 0.0%
99-00 9.7% 0.5% 0.000% 0.1%
00-01 9.9% 0.5% 0.000% 0.0%
01-02 9.9% 0.6% 0.000% 0.0%
02-03 9.9% 0.6% 0.000% 0.0%
03-04 10.1% 0.7% 0.002% 0.3%
04-05 10.2% 0.7% 0.003% 0.5%
05-06 10.8% 0.8% 0.004% 0.5%
06-07 11.5% 1.0% 0.005% 0.5%
95-07 218.4% 7.2% 0.016% 0.2%
Notes: Entries are predicted welfare changes from productivity growth in China computed using the long-run
version of the model (Case I) and the short-run version of the model (Case II). World welfare gain is average
welfare gain in the world weighted by each countrys output share. Rest of World refers to countries other
than China. 95-07 welfare gain (last row for each case) is cumulative welfare gain from 1995 to 2007.
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TABLE 8: Welfare E¤ects in Full Model and Special Case
Case I: Long-run Case II: Short-run
Full model Special case Full model Special case
Brazil -0.05% -0.01% 0.02% 0.06%
Canada -0.23% 0.08% 0.05% 0.06%
Germany -0.02% -0.05% -0.02% 0.01%
Spain -0.11% -0.03% -0.02% 0.02%
France -0.01% -0.02% 0.00% 0.03%
United Kingdom -0.07% -0.06% 0.00% 0.01%
India 0.14% 0.11% 0.06% 0.07%
Italy 0.00% 0.00% -0.01% 0.05%
Japan 0.08% 0.08% -0.01% -0.01%
South Korea 0.23% 0.29% 0.02% 0.17%
Mexico 0.07% 0.02% 0.08% 0.06%
Russia -0.12% -0.03% 0.06% -0.02%
United States 0.00% 0.03% 0.03% 0.02%
Rest of the World -0.14% 0.17% 0.03% 0.12%
Median -0.02% 0.01% 0.02% 0.04%
Notes: Entries are cumulative e¤ects from 1995 to 2007 from Chinas productivity growth. Case I reports
the results obtained using the long-run version of the model and Case II reports the results obtained using
the short-run version of the model. The results under "Special case" are computed using the special case
of the full model without multiple factors, nontraded goods, and intermediate goods (which involves setting
rhol1=rhol2=0.99, rhok1=rhok2=0.01, and eta1=eta2=1 as well as dropping non-tradables).
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TABLE 9: Decomposition of Welfare Gains in Special Case
Case I: Long-run Case II: Short-run
Terms-of-trade Firm delocation Terms-of-trade Prot shifting
Brazil 0.02% -0.03% 0.04% 0.02%
Canada -0.06% 0.14% 0.04% 0.02%
Germany -0.01% -0.04% 0.04% -0.02%
Spain 0.00% -0.03% 0.01% 0.00%
France 0.02% -0.04% 0.03% 0.00%
United Kingdom -0.01% -0.05% 0.01% -0.01%
India 0.15% -0.04% 0.03% 0.04%
Italy 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% 0.04%
Japan -0.03% 0.11% -0.01% 0.00%
South Korea 0.05% 0.25% 0.10% 0.08%
Mexico 0.02% 0.00% 0.09% -0.03%
Russia -0.06% 0.04% -0.06% 0.04%
United States -0.04% 0.08% 0.04% -0.02%
Rest of the World -0.02% 0.18% 0.08% 0.04%
Median -0.01% 0.00% 0.03% 0.01%
Notes: Entries are cumulative e¤ects from 1995 to 2007 from Chinas productivity growth. The individual

























Figure 1: Distribution of productivity growth across manufacturing industries in China
Notes: These are kernel density plots of the geometric averages of the estimated productivity growth rates
from 1995 to 2007 across manufacturing industries in China. The plotted growth rates are either adjusted only
for intermediate goods or also for Melitz (2003) selection e¤ects using the long-run or short-run version of the
model.
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Figure 2: Welfare e¤ect in full model versus special case
Notes: This gure plots the entries from Table 8. The lines indicate the location of equal welfare changes.
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Figure 3: Industry productivity growth and industry net exports in China
Notes: This gure plots the relationship between industry productivity growth and normalized industry net
exports in China. The productivity growth estimates are adjusted for intermediate goods and Melitz (2003)
selection e¤ects with the top panel using the long-run and the bottom panel using the short-run version of
the model. Industry net exports are computed as the simple average of industry net exports from 1995-2007.
Total trade is computed as the simple average of the sum of exports and imports from 1995-2007. The lines
are linear regression lines.
48






















Figure 4: Industry productivity growth and industry trade elasticities in China
Notes: This gure plots the relationship between industry productivity growth and industry trade elasticities
in China. The productivity growth estimates are adjusted for intermediate goods and Melitz (2003) selection
e¤ects with the top panel using the long-run and the bottom panel using the short-run version of the model.
The lines are linear regression lines.
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Figure 5: Industry entry and industry productivity growth in China
Notes: This gure plots the relationship between industry productivity growth and industry entry in China .
The top panel shows results computed using the long-run version of the model while the bottom panel turns
to results computed using the short-run version of the model. Productivity growth is computed as in Figure 1.
Industry entry is computed as the simple average of the predicted annual changes in the number of industry
entrants from 1995-2007. The lines are linear regression lines.
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